






School of Economics 
 
 
Working Paper 2005-04 
 
 
Towards a Relational Economics: 
Methodological Comments on Intellectual 











School of Economics 
University of Adelaide University, 5005 Australia 
 
 
ISSN 1444 8866   1
Towards a Relational Economics 
Methodological Comments on Intellectual Property Strategy, 
Industrial Organisation, and Economics
1 
 
This version: June 4, 2004 
 
by Eran Binenbaum 
University of Adelaide 
 





  This paper sketches elements of what it intends to be an improved 
methodology for theoretical and applied economic analysis, and applies these to the 
area of economics of intellectual property strategy, which may be viewed as a subset 
of the field of industrial organisation. 
A core question addressed here is: Can mainstream economic methodology be 
improved, and if so, how?  In the process, we shall also consider the following 
questions: Is there much scope for improvement of intellectual property strategy?  Is 
such improvement valuable?  Can economics, and in particular the field of industrial 
organisation, help achieve it?   
The improvements in economic methodology that are suggested in this paper 
may be summarized under the heading of relational economics.  An important aspect 
of this methodology is an emphasis on inter-organisational relations.  Industrial 
organisation is perhaps the field of mainstream economics that traditionally focuses 
most clearly on these relations.  It will be argued below that this field is currently 
undergoing a process of ‘natural’ expansion of its scope – an expansion which will 
enable it to take centre stage in the emerging methodology of relational economics. 
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Thus, this paper aims to serve the triple purpose of contributing to economic 
methodology; to the meta-theory and methodology of industrial economics – and of 
the economics of intellectual property strategy in particular; and to intellectual 
property strategy itself, which is used as an exemplar of the shortcomings of 
mainstream economic methodology.  However, the paper’s emphasis will be positive 
rather than negative; it focuses on the scope for improvement rather than on the 
development of critiques. 
 
 
2. The Gulf Between Economics and Management Studies 
 
What is the future of economics?  This is not a futile question, but rather one 
that may spur innovative economic research and may thus hasten the arrival of that 
future.  The discipline of economics is changing.  Four trends are particularly worthy 
of mention. 
First, interest in departures from Homo Economicus – defined as the set of 
behavioural assumptions that underpin traditional neoclassical microeconomics – has 
increased among economic modellers.  The pioneering work of Simon (1982), 
followed by advances in behavioural and experimental economics, has resulted in a 
widespread belief among mainstream economists that quasi-rationality is a better 
modelling assumption in many economic settings than perfect rationality (Thaler 
1994).  Various schools of thought in social economics have long argued that Adam 
Smith’s dichotomy between self-interest which is mainly operative in the marketplace 
– as well as in economic life more generally – and concern for others, which, 
according to Smith, is – or ought to be – more important in other realms of life (Smith 
1759; 1776), is unwarranted (Binenbaum 2004a; Lutz 1999; Lux 1990).  The interest 
in departures from the self-interest assumption has increased in mainstream 
economics.  It is now considered cutting-edge mainstream economics to incorporate 
insights from mainstream psychology and sociology into contract theory, market 
analysis, finance, and game theory (Akerlof 1984; Rabin 1993, 1998).  For example, 
corporate culture – relevant, for instance, to the compatibility of prospective partners, 
and hence to IPS – can be subjected to game analysis (Hermalin 2001).  The trend to 
make economics more sophisticated in a cognitive and motivational sense has been 
confirmed and reinforced by recent Nobel prizes for Akerlof, Kahneman, and Smith,   3
as well as Rabin’s recent Clark Medal, and has enhanced the discipline’s real-world 
relevance. 
Second, improved econometric techniques and vastly increased data supplies 
and software capacity have also increased economists’ capacity for bridging the gap 
between theory on the one hand and empirics and policy or management advice on the 
other. 
Third, economic analysis is witnessing an amazing proliferation of models to 
analyse a wide variety of difficult topics such as choice under uncertainty, strategic 
interaction, research-and-development (R&D) collaboration and consortia, intellectual 
property (IP) licensing, etc. etc.  Economists need to ‘sell’ their work and adapt their 
analyses for real-world relevance while improving rigour to elicit peer admiration.  
These complex incentives are perhaps the main driving forces behind the current 
acceleration in the discipline’s progress in terms of quantity, quality and scope of 
research output.   
This is closely related to the fourth and final trend that I wish to highlight.  
The connection between economics and business studies is being strengthened 
through economists’ increased interest in entering the firm’s ‘black box’ and business 
schools’ and management scholars’ desire to add theoretical and empirical rigour and 
insights from game theory and contract theory to their research portfolios and toolkits.  
This connection has long been rather weak, with economists and management 
scholars sceptical or downright dismissive of each other’s methodologies.  In fact, the 
common institutional separation between economics and management studies into 
separate academic departments does not make sense according to practically any 
definition of economics (Binenbaum 2002).  Business schools are keen to hire 
economists.  Even more tellingly, leading consulting firms like McKinsey’s require 
their management strategy experts to take crash courses in game theory (pers. com. 
Phil Killicoat).  (Altough it is equally telling that these are only crash courses.)  The 
firm is at the core of production, which in turn is at the core of market-based 
economic systems, and the ‘black box’ treatment of a firm as a profit-maximising 
machine is no longer the undisputed core modelling assumption concerning firm 
behaviour in mainstream economics (Simon 1982).  As the axiom of perfect profit 
maximisation clashes with the neoclassicals’ beloved tenet of methodological 
individualism, its footing on the slippery slopes of economic analysis is even less sure 
than its counterpart in economic analysis of individual behaviour –  perfect   4
rationality.  This is certainly recognised by most mainstream economists, and a vast 
literature applying the neoclassical and game theory apparatus to intra-firm processes 
has emerged. 
However, the level of cross-fertilisation between economics and business 
studies, while having risen, is still sub-optimal.  There is still a vast methodological 
rift between orthodox economists’ modelling approaches and purported positivism on 
the one hand and the eclecticism and methodological pluralism shared by business 
schools, real-world managers and heterodox economics on the other.  Mainstream 
economists tend to have a poor understanding of their own methodology (Hausman 
1992), but their de facto methodology is very far removed from that of, say, the field 
of strategic management (with Michael Porter, who is often considered its leading 
practitioner, being somewhat atypical in that he has a firm grounding in mainstream 
microeconomics).  This, combined with economists’ poor marketing skills, may have 
resulted in a continuing under-appreciation of the potential contributions of 
economics to strategic management. 
At the same time, mainstream economics could benefit from some version of 
the Gestalt approach that is characteristic of management studies.  Due to the dismal 
science’s preference for theoretical and empirical rigour – i.e., mathematical and 
statistical sophistication – peers who produce parsimonious and aesthetical models 
and obtain compelling results are highly regarded in the profession.  Much less 
emphasis is given to inter-field intra-disciplinary as well as inter-disciplinary cross-
fertilisation.  Thus, mainstream economics may be suffering from misdirected 
specialisation.  To be sure, many economists realise the importance of eclecticism and 
are willing to look at any sources to find stylised and modellable facts.  But they lack 
a methodology for rapidly accessing a wide variety of fields and disciplines.  Since, in 
the absence of such a methodology, doing so would require amounts of research 
assistance that are out of reach for the vast majority of academic economists, they 
have to make do with cursory searches and gut intuition to get their modelling input.  
Multidisciplinary work among academics would be an alternative, but here the 
methodological, conceptual and cultural gaps between the disciplines – in particular 
their mutual prejudices and under-appreciation – constitute significant obstacles.  The 
gaps between the fields of economics are not as great, but here, again, tools for rapid 
access to multiple bodies of literature are lacking.  Even within a field, say law-and- 
economics, there are many distinct sub-fields that may have little interaction.  And, as   5
will be further argued below, this lack of interaction may be sub-optimal given the 
untapped potential for rapid access to literatures one is unfamiliar with. 
In summary, mainstream economics is still – though less than before – 
suffering from insufficient cross-fertilisation with other disciplines and also – perhaps 
even more than before, due to rapid increases in the sheer amount of research output – 
among fields and probably even sub-fields of economics.  I submit that the root cause
2 
of these problems can be found in economists’ de facto methodology of parsimonious 
modelling that emphasises the quality of modelling technique over the quality of 
modelling input, and in particular in this methodology’s neglect, ignorance, or 
implicit disdain of systemic, taxonomic and cognitive considerations.  A way forward 
for economics is to become better integrated with management studies, but this 
requires an improved methodology that integrates economic insights into a larger 
framework and makes them accessible to management experts.  If this meta-
theoretical research program is realised, which I trust it will, both economics and 
management studies will benefit, with the latter becoming what it logically ought to 
be, namely a field of economics, and the former fully rather than half-heartedly 
adopting the eclecticism of the latter without surrendering any rigour (although it is 
always good to have heterodox economists around who do not believe in the 
mainstream notions of rigour), which it probably never would.  As will be argued 
below, an improved methodology would actually, in a sense, be more rigorous than 
the existing practices. 
 
 
3. The Economics of IP Strategy As Exemplar 
 
What would this improved methodology look like?  I shall only sketch some 
of its more salient points in this paper, with many blanks to be filled in elsewhere. 
Rather than discuss methodology in the abstract, let us consider a concrete 
sub-field of economic research, namely the economics of IP strategy (TEIPS; IPS).  I 
selected this field in particular – as a case study for the purpose of sketching the new 
methodology – for the following reasons.  First, it is exemplary of a sub-field to 
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which the conventional economic methodology is ill-suited – as will be argued below.  
Second, it is at the core of understanding the knowledge economy, and thus likely to 
become more important relative to other sub-fields of economics.  Third, IPS is a sub-
field of strategic management.  Fourth, it is an area with which I am fairly familiar, 
having written two of my Ph.D. dissertation chapters on IPS (which led to three 
publications: Binenbaum et al. 2003, 2004; Binenbaum 2004b).  Fifth, as explained in 
the next section, it is highly suitable to be used as an examplar for the development of 
a new methodology because it clearly lacks a hard core of a small set of canonical 
choice problems.  Sixth and finally, TEIPS is part of this paper’s topic: I would hope 
for the paper to contribute to the meta-theory and practice of IPS. 
 
 
4. Irreducible complexity as a distinctive feature of the economics of IPS 
 
Readers unfamiliar with economics or critical of mainstream microeconomics 
may argue that irreducible complexity is a feature of economic reality (see, for 
instance, practically any book written by Israel Kirzner).  The position that I’d like to 
defend is not quite that radical.  Various fields of economics, including for example 
core neoclassical microeconomics, labour economics, industrial organisation, and 
finance, are centred around a small number of canonical choice problems: for 
instance, in the case of core micro theory, the textbook consumer and firm choice 
models.  These are then the building blocks for analysing systemic interactions, in 
particular markets.  The point here is that such canonical choice problems are lacking 
in the economics of IPS, because there is no way of cutting down the key choices to 
compelling parsimonious models.  Two of the key choices, in the case of IPS, are (a) 
an R&D organisation’s response to its need for a proprietary technology input, and (b) 
whether or not to take out IP on a given research result. Let’s consider each in turn. 
Consider organisation X – a for-profit or nonprofit organisation that is active 
in R&D. Suppose a member of X’s research staff or legal team notifies the relevant 
manager or CEO that an enabling technology needed for a planned R&D project is   7
actually owned by somebody.  Potential strategies for dealing with this problem 
include the following.
3 
1. X may negotiate for a license as a gift (in some cases relevant for nonprofits) or in 
exchange for royalties. 
2. X may unilaterally access the technology - potentially leading to legal conflict. 
3. X may contest the IPR either in court or at the IP-granting agency. 
4. X may attempt to ‘invent around’ the technology, possibly leading to a valuable 
asset (in exchange or collaborative relations) that may compete with the original 
input. 
Note that even when any of the potentially adversarial moves (the second, third or 
fourth options) are not carried out, they may still play a role as implied, perceived, or 
explicit threats, in combination with one or more of the other options. 
5. X may initiate an R&D partnership with the input’s owner; use rights to the input 
may be part of the partnership’s package deal.  
6. X may join or initiate a consortium or patent pool.  The consortium may include 
other parties interested in the proprietary input, and may focus on the input or have 
some broader theme. 
7. If the input is critical and unavailable, X may abandon the R&D project. 
8. X may abandon the R&D program, but catalyse or contract with other organisations 
better able to deal with the input problem to undertake the R&D program instead.  
This may involve the other organisations’ use of any of the first six options.   
9. Funding opportunities might be available in combination with some of the 
aforementioned options.  For example, in the case of an international nonprofit, 
perhaps the home government of the input’s owner might be willing to help subsidise 
use of the input. 
10. In the case that X is a for-profit firm, a merger with or acquisition of the input’s 
owner might solve the problem. 
11.  Institutional solutions at a more general level than those mentioned so far may be 
found, for example through international treaties or lobbying efforts. 
 
While the list does not completely overlap nonprofits and for-profits, we do 
have about 10 alternatives in either case.  For each of these alternatives, we can 
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identify subsets of nested choices.  The result is a decision tree and, if other players’ 
actions are taken into account, a game tree.  No matter which branch, sub-branch, sub-
sub-branch, etc., is followed, at some point we arrive at a situation which can actually 
be mathematically modelled as a game.  However, the initial problem, which is easily 
enough posed in a few words – “the need for a proprietary input” – cannot be 
fruitfully addressed by a full game model, as it is too complex.  And there is no 
compelling way of assuming away enough options and other complicating factors so 
that the problem can be reduced to yield a parsimonious model that can serve as a 
canonical choice problem. 
Next, consider the choice whether or not to seek IP protection.  Abstracting 
from multiple jurisdictions and from issues of timing, this can be reduced to a binary 
choice problem.  As the direct costs are relatively unproblematic, let’s focus on the 
benefit side of this choice.  A number of motives – mostly well-known in the 
literature – for seeking IP protection can be discerned.   
Clarification of Rights.  IP serve a clarifying role and may reduce transaction 
costs, for example by clearly establishing partners’ technological contributions in a 
collaboration. 
The Defensive Motive.  IP can prevent others from appropriating the 
technology. 
The Direct Revenue Motive.  The IP holder may license the technology in 
exchange for royalties. 
Technology Transfer and Development Incentives.  A licence may give a 
partner firm incentives for downstream development and commercialisation, thus 
realizing the potential value of research results. 
The “Bargaining Chip” Motive.  IP can be used to strengthen its holder’s 
bargaining position in collaborations, patent pools, and consortia. 
The Threat Motive.  The threat of infringement lawsuits may make other 
players behave in ways compatible to the IP holder’s objectives. 
  The Signalling Motive.  IP may demonstrate its holder’s innovative capability 
and enhance its reputation, making it a more attractive partner. 
Control of Technology and Liability. The control of a technology afforded 
by IP may enable its developer to prevent others from using the technology in ways 
inimical to the developer’s objectives, for example by exposing the developer to 
liability lawsuits.   9
Notice that each motive is based on some sort of games, i.e. strategic 
interaction.  However, these games are all different and cannot be neatly combined 
into a single model.  Thus, again, we have elements of the original problem which 
lend themselves for modelling, but a canonical choice problem cannot be constructed. 
On the input side, we looked at the different options for dealing with a 
problem, and didn’t even talk about the associated costs and benefits.  On the output 
side, we simplified the problem to a binary choice, but then identified a number of 
disparate potential categories of benefits.  In either case, a canonical choice problem 
is unavailable.  Having dissected the choice problems on the input and the output side 
in this way, let’s move up one level. We need to combine all such input and output 
choices of a decision-making unit into a single portfolio problem.  Note that in 
financial economics we have very neat portfolio models that serve as the field’s 
canonical choice problems.  These concern investment under uncertainty, as do R&D 
choice problems (which are closely connected to IP problems).  However, while the 
latter exhibit uncertainty and portfolio complications similar to the former, in addition 
they feature complicated strategic interactions – as discussed – that cannot be 
fruitfully ignored. 
As a final element of the irreducible complexity of IPS, consider the 
interaction between each player and the overall system.  Players who understand the 
innovation system they are part of will make better-informed IP choices.  However, 
this implies that we have one big game, in which the players’ strategies and 
expectations are simultaneously determined through some type of dynamic solution 
concept.  As will be obvious to anyone familiar with game theory, such an analysis is 
most certainly not feasible. 
 
 
5. Why should we care? 
  
If there is a disconnect between strategic management of IP and economics, 
why should IP strategists care?  Do economics and game theory have anything 
valuable to offer?  The answer is, they do.  Game theory is none other than the logic 
of strategic interaction, and games reflect real-world patterns.   
For example, suppose you are the manager of a small biotech firm negotiating 
the licensing of your technology to a multinational for whom it is useful in   10
conjunction with other technologies already in its portfolio.  Thus, for you, valuation 
of the technology is not a relatively straightforward exercise in market assessment.  
Consequently, the multinational possesses superior information about how valuable it 
considers the technology to be, and it is not going to volunteer the information.  In 
such a situation, you may benefit from an understanding of the literature on revelation 
mechanisms (Salanie).  With the proper bargaining strategy, you may elicit actions 
from the other side that implicitly reveal their preferences.  This may allow you to 
reap a far greater share of the value generated by the deal than you would otherwise. 
This example concerns essentially a zero-sum game: bargaining about the 
division of a given (but, to you, unknown) total net benefit.  Perhaps even more 
compelling are examples of the usefulness of insights emanating from games that 
exhibit potential Pareto improvements.  For example, consider a situation where two 
AIDS researchers each may either share or not share their data with the other.   
Assume that the two data sets are synergistic: their combined value is greater than the 
sum of their separate values.  “Value” in this case may depend on the likelihood and 
speed of finding an AIDS cure.  By sharing your data, you benefit the other researcher 
as well as patients, but you also reduce your own expected net benefits, as the other 
side captures part of your market (for a firm) or publication potential (for an 
academic).  This situation can be viewed as a Prisoners’ Dilemma with additional 
externalities, where the Pareto-optimal solution is for both researchers to share their 
data, but in the unique Nash Equilibrium, neither does. As a result, everyone – 
researchers and patients – is worse off than could be the case.  This may well reflect a 
common pattern in real-world interactions between R&D units.  Such game analysis 
might also point to ways to resolve the dilemma, perhaps through IP arrangements 
that change the incentive structure or allow credible commitments, so that both 
researchers in fact do share their data and the medicine is discovered sooner, saving 
lives. 
The Folk Theorem is another important result.  Partnerships can be viewed as 
cooperative equilibria in multi-stage games.  What the Folk Theorem says is that 
when the time horizon in such games is unclear, a wide range of equilibria may be 
sustainable.  This means that players may be stuck in a ‘low’ equilibrium and have the 
potential, with some improved partnership arrangement, to move to a higher one.   
Again, such insights may well be applicable to real-world situations.   11
There are many more such examples where game theory may help managers 
better understand strategic interaction.  No wonder that business schools are 
increasingly serious about incorporating applied game theory courses into their MBA 
programs, with the top schools being the innovators. 
Generally, incentive problems are an important source of potential Pareto 
improvements and therefore may provide rationales for government policy or business 
opportunities, following the logic of Coase (1960).  Categories of incentive problems 
include market power; externalities, including public goods; problems associated with 
asymmetric information, including moral hazard (hidden actions), adverse selection 
(hidden characteristics where the ignorant player moves first) and signalling (hidden 
characteristics of the player who moves first); distortion and misinformation to 
disadvantage rivals; Prisoners’ Dilemmas; game dynamics, including hold-ups, 
commitment problems, and punishment strategies; and incentive problems associated 
with cognitive limitations (for example, the common over-estimation by organisations 
of their own capabilities may hamper partnerships – Heller & Eisenberg 1998)  Any 
time there is inefficiency due to an incentive problem, there may be scope to reduce 
the inefficiency and make the parties involved better off.  This may, in fact, be an 
under-appreciated source of business opportunities, as managers may generally not be 
aware of some of these concepts. 
There are many hybrids of types of incentive problems.  For instance, the 
“tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller & Eisenberg 1998), which is the consequence 
of there being too many property rights, with many pieces of complementary IP assets 
dispersed among various owners, is an amalgam of many of these incentive problems. 
 
 
6. Meta-Modelling of Relations 
 
Given that insights from game theory are relevant to IPS, and given the latter’s 
irreducible complexity, there is a gap between the two which it is worth bridging.  
How to do this?  For this purpose, I propose an approach that may be called meta-
modelling of relations (MEMOREL).  This is less pretentious than it sounds.  Meta-
modelling just means organizing models into a larger system.  As the subgames that 
are amenable to modelling all form a part of the same system – and even need to be 
combined to understand a single individual choice problem – and as these cannot be   12
combined into a single big model, a feasible strategy is to organise them using a 
taxonomic effort.  In particular, the relevant games can all be classified using a 
taxonomy of inter-organisational relationships.  Relevant types of relationships 
include gift, exchange, theft, adversarial relations including competition, coordination 
including collusion, collaboration (joint production), communication, command and 
ownership, catalysis (the provision of incentives), and discouragement (disincentives).  
There is some overlap between these types, and – just as the incentive problems – 
they often form hybrids.  For example, two organisations may have a relationship 
with both competitive and collaborative elements.  If we take the above example on 
the need for a proprietary input, each of the options identified leads into some 
combinations of these relation types.  When we analyse a specific relationship, these 
various types provide a valuable checklist.  Is there a gift element in the relationship, 
an exchange element, and so on (Binenbaum, Pardey & Wright 2001)? As an 
organisation makes its IPS choices, with each choice it will have to take into account 
the relational implications of its prior choices.   If one choice yields a competitive 
relationship with organisation A, this might affect another choice that would generate 
a collaborative relationship with A.  Thus we should think of organisations having 
portfolios of relationships as well as portfolios of IP assets. 
  The taxonomy of relationships may help organise insights from the literature 
so that they can be accessed for IPS purposes.  For example, when contemplating a 
choice that would lead to a relationship that has both competitive and collaborative 
elements, a literature search system should be able to pick this up and lead the analyst 
quickly to references such as Hamel, Doz & Pralahad (1989) or Fusfeld & Haklisch 
(1985). 
  A decision tree mapping would link the alternative strategies in a choice 
problem such as ‘needing a proprietary input’ to analyses of subgames amenable to 
rigorous analysis.  Thus a sub-sub-sub-branch of the tree might be the decision to 
settle or not to settle patent litigation.  Here, one could be directed to a reference such 
as Somaya (2003).  To give another example, in the same problem, a research joint 
venture may occur as a sub-branch of the inventing-around or partnering-with-IP-
owner strategies.  In either of these sub-branches, we might be directed towards a 
reference such as Hernan et al. (2003).  To understand the game, we need to 
understand the subgames.   13
  MEMOREL is closely related to meta-theory.  Transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1975, 1985) is concerned with the contrast between markets (exchange, 
competition) and hierarchies (command); industrial organisation, with competition 
versus collusion; and the innovation systems literature (Nelson 1993), with 
collaborative networks.  This means that to understand a single choice problem, which 
as we saw involves multiple relationship types, we may need to access several of such 
paradigms and fields. 
  As the innovation system in which IP strategists operate is so complex, it is a 
worthwhile exercise just to figure out what’s there.  What would constitute a complete 
description of the system?  In doing so, it is helpful to realise that we do not just need 
the nodes of the system (the players) but also all of the different types of relationships 
between them.  This is where some analyses go wrong.  For instance, a recent 
comparative OECD study on national innovation systems in biotechnology used 
exclusively data on collaborative relations, ignoring all other types of relations 
between the players. 
  In addition to relation types and decision trees, I suggest that MEMOREL 
would also involve the use of a number of additional taxonomies and concepts.  One 
of these is the list of benefits of IP ownership.  At least three of the items on this list 
each have a separate body of literature devoted to them: the defensive use of patents; 
royalty generation; and the use of patents as bargaining chips (see Somaya 2002 and 
references cited therein).  Clearly, these literatures are complementary, especially in 
the sense of their insights needing to be combined in order to analyse a single decision 
(whether or not to seek IP ownership, for example). 
  Game theory does not require rationality, self-interest, profit maximisation or 
exogenous preferences.  As it is a logic of strategic interaction, the requisite 
components to fully describe a game can also be used as building blocks for systemic 
description.  Thus, additional taxonomies that can be used for MEMOREL include 
those of players, objectives, choice variables (including types of IP), technologies, 
information structure and flows, and types of incentive problems.  Players, objectives, 
technologies, choice variables and information structure are components of game 
models.  The better we manage to specify them, the better we understand the strategic 
interaction, even when we don’t explicitly model a game. 
  Technologies are, of course, critical to the system.  The global IP system, in 
particular the patent system, allows for the identification of separate chunks of   14
technology.  These are owned by players in the system and also have relationships 
between them.  Technologies can be complements or substitutes, and some 
technologies enable the development of further technologies.  These relationships 
between technologies are closely related to the relationships between the players 
(Teece 1986).  For instance, Graff et al. (2003) explain the recent wave of merger 
activity in the life sciences by reference to the companies’ need to combine 
complementary IP assets.  
Another key element of MEMOREL is a checklist of incentive problems, as 
discussed above. 
  With all these interlocking elements in place, we can hope to apply economic 
insights to understanding the innovation system and design appropriate IP strategies. 
  The result would be a coherent structure of game trees and taxonomies that 
would incorporate myriad contributions from the literature.  With the help of such a 
structure, an analyst would be able to quickly identify most of the known relevant 
aspects to an IP-related decision and have access to insights that would otherwise be 
too disparate and difficult to locate.  For instance, following up on the litigation 
settlement example, someone interested in the choice of litigation vis-à-vis other 
options of dealing with the need for a proprietary input, could access a MEMOREL 
schematic posted on the Web, and, following the game tree, quickly locate Somaya 
(2003) and that article’s insights.  According to the game-theoretic principle of 
backward induction, players solve games backwards, starting from the last subgame.  
Thus, in weighing whether to litigate or pursue some other option, players should 
anticipate the possibility of settlement of litigation. 
In addition, the structure would facilitate the design of information systems 
that support IP decisions.  Having identified all relationship types between players, we 
can be more confident that we won’t overlook important data types that would affect 
our analyses.  The empirical and practical challenges of a fully informed IPS are 
daunting.  However, rapid improvements in information technology allow for the use 
of ever larger and more complex datasets in management information systems.  In 
summary, due to improvements in data systems, changes in economics and game 
theory, and historical under-use of economic insights by IPS practicioners, there is 
scope for improvement in IPS. 
MEMOREL would lend itself well to be integrated with existing methods for 
the innovation management process, such as the Delphi method (Betz 1996),   15
brainstorming, and scenario planning.  There may have been a perception among 
management experts that mainstream economic methodology sacrifices too much 
realism to produce practically applicable insights.  However, what microeconomic 
and game models and the associated empirical tests do is identify patterns (such as 
incentive problems) that are intermittently relevant to real-world situations.  These 
models don’t claim to describe laws, but rather provide tools that enhance 
understanding of strategic interactions and potential efficiency improvements.  They 
are no substitute for, but complements to, analysts’ intuitions.  Their insights will 
become accessible and applicable for managers and lawyers only if they are organised 
in a user-friendly way, in an encompassing coherent structure.  It is only then that 
their potential for improving IPS may be realised.  Once a MEMOREL source is in 
place, it can be used to help structure the process of IPS design.  Especially if 
supported by attractive visual representations, MEMOREL would help IP strategists 
develop Gestalt intuitions, i.e. intuitive integrative insights into the system. 
In summary, MEMOREL could lend more structure and completeness to IPS 
at the conceptual, analytical and empirical levels.  To be sure, much about 
MEMOREL still needs to be worked out.  But, thinking about economic 
methodology, one realises that the need for such a methodology is almost a historical 
necessity, as will be argued in the next section. 
 
 
7. The Fundamental Methodological Transformation 
 
 The  de facto methodology of the discourse in economics is centred around a 
hierarchy of canonical choice problems, with the general microeconomic model of 
consumer and producer behaviour at the top of the hierarchy.  At the next level are 
canonical choice problems for major fields of economics such as finance or industrial 
organisation.  There may be one or more levels lower down, with economists trying to 
develop canonical choice problems (including multi-agent choice problems, i.e. 
games) for each sub-field, sub-sub-field, etc.  Mainstream economists face powerful 
incentives to do so.  Once a distinct area of research emerges, “you” – if you are 
willing to put yourself in the shoes of a mainstream academic economist –, being 
interested in contributing to that area, would almost die for producing the future 
canonical choice model for that area.  Hence, if after decades of attempts, such a   16
canonical choice model is absent from an area of economic research – in particular 
one with such obvious relevance and funding potential as TEIPS – that may simply 
mean that it is intrinsically unavailable.  And, in the case of TEIPS, it probably is.  
That is a good thing, because due to the disciplinary dynamics of mainstream 
economics, economists are arguably addicted to generating and reinforcing canonical 
choice problems. 
  The compelling power of canonical choice problems has been undermined by 
all of the aforementioned trends in economics: the erosion of homo economicus, 
which used to be the foundation par excellence for canonical choice models; the 
improved econometrics, computing power, and data provision, which reduce the need 
for parsimony; the explosion of modelling creativity, which is slowly co-evolving 
with an emergent free-spirited modelling culture that prizes those papers that break 
free from the mould of pre-existing exemplars; and, finally, mainstream economists’ 
increasing dissatisfaction with the black-box approach to the firm, which used to be so 
helpful precisely because it solidified one of microeconomics’ two core canonical 
choice problems, namely that of the profit maximising firm. 
  Economics is therefore ripe for abandoning its obsession with canonical 
choice problems, and for a fundamental methodological transformation.  That 
transformation will have to accommodate the increasing need to address systemic 
complexity and will need to be conducive – rather than inimical – to the intra- and 
interdisciplinary inspirational exchange of ideas.  It will therefore have to get serious 
about considering the question of what constitutes a full systemic description.  It will 
also have to acknowledge and incorporate the simultaneous existence – even within a 
single choice problem – of multiple relationship types.  Mainstream microeconomics, 
by its nature, considers itself as being virtually identical to game theory, with the 
absence of strategic interaction – as in the textbook account of perfect competition – 
as a special case.  As game theory is about modelling relationships, economics will 
have to come to grips with their inherent complexity.  Moreover, in providing 
systemic descriptions, the nodes – decision-making units – need to be somehow 
connected, and it is critically important to understand the various ways in which they 
can be connected.  In a nutshell, economics is in need of a move towards MEMOREL 
– a meta-theoretical structure which combines systemic thinking and relational 
thinking, and which closely follows the logic of game theory.  If the profession   17
accomplishes this fundamental transformation, its contribution to and standing in 
society are likely to be further enhanced. 
 
 
8. Limited Understanding of IPS 
  
There is another reason why MEMOREL offers TEIPS - and therefore IPS – 
substantial scope for improvement: It may assist in rationalising the process of 
strategy design. 
The quasi-rationality of economic agents is by now a well-accepted insight in 
economics (Thaler 1994).  Quasi-rationality is not random but follows certain 
patterns.  The list of cognitive errors and judgemental biases is long.  These include 
self-overestimation; a bias towards information that is easily accessible from memory; 
anchoring, the tendency to give information acquired at an early stage a special status; 
preference reversals when (what ought to be) irrelevant alternatives are added to the 
choice set; a failure to ignore sunk costs; a failure to consider opportunity costs; 
animal spirits in financial markets; etc. etc. (Shiller 2001; Frank 2002; Heller & 
Eisenberg 1998).  An important point to make here is that people do have a capacity 
to learn and become more rational, i.e. to come closer to actually pursuing their own 
objectives.  For example, people can learn about ignoring sunk costs and considering 
opportunity costs.   
  All this applies to any kind of economic behaviour, including IPS 
management.  Szakonyi (1996:14.8-9) reports that “few R&D organisations have an 
R&D strategy – or have established the preconditions required for developing and 
R&D strategy.”  Davis & Harrison (2001) document the existence of five different 
levels of awareness of IPS in firms: defensive (the lowest level); a focus on cost 
control; a focus on profit generation, but limited to profit centres; strategically 
integrated IPS; and visionary IPS (the highest level).  Each level builds on all lower 
levels.  This demonstrates that rational IPS is by no means a given and that 
rationalisation and learning are key aspects of IPS. 
  These considerations strengthen the case for there being much scope for 
improvement in IPS, and thus the case for the value of MEMOREL.  Consultants and 
managers tend to be highly intelligent people and put great faith into their own gut 
feeling.  But the evidence of behavioural economics indisputably indicates that human   18
intuition, while performing impressively in pattern recognition, simultaneously suffers 
from systematic shortcomings that bias such recognition.  The logic of human 
learning suggests that these shortcomings are not inevitable.  A structure that 
facilitates cross- and intradisciplinary inspiration may assist those who think 
themselves smart, but are only dimly aware of other smart people’s relevant insights, 
to improve their prowess in applied analysis. 
 
 
9. MEMOREL as a Public Good 
  
To put a MEMOREL structure of insights from the various literatures as well 
as a corresponding data system in place would require a multidisciplinary team of 
experts.  The taxonomic structure of MEMOREL could help arrange the necessary 
division of labour and coordination between the collaborators.  This could be 
analogous to the organisation of constructing a building.  Because the structure of the 
building is planned in advance, the different construction specialists can be 
coordinated properly, and a fairly large team can jointly produce the building.  The 
lack of such a structure may so far have precluded the design of a conceptual, 
taxonomic and analytical system bridging the gap between economics and IPS.  For 
this very reason, there is scope for improvement in the (meta-)theoretical foundations 
of IPS. 
It is clear that there are significant economies of scale and scope in such an 
effort.  There are economies of scale due to routinisation of collection and 
compilation of data and literature abstracts.   There are economies of scope, because 
adding elements to systemic structures tends to enhance the value of the elements 
already included in the structure.  The insights from the different literatures are 
largely complementary and synergistic.  There is tremendous value added in getting a 
systemic overview rather than a view of the parts. 
  Thus, the provision of MEMOREL is a natural monopoly; additionally, it has 
important public goods aspects, as do many kinds of information and analytical tools.  
Private players – commercial data providers and consulting firms – have an incentive 
to sell their data and insights on a piecemeal, customer-by-customer basis only.  There 
is room here for a division of labour between the public and private sectors.  Due to 
the technological characteristics of the production and use of MEMOREL, it would   19
make sense to provide data as well as the general analytical system collectively rather 
than privately.  For instance, an Open Source structure could be developed for 
contributions to TEIPS literature.  An author could post a paper – with standardised 
abstract – at the appropriate location (e.g. a node in a game tree) in the open 
MEMOREL source.  There would still need to be people to design and coordinate the 
MEMOREL structure.  In addition, a MEMOREL-related data system could also be 
made publicly available; here an Open Source setup might be appropriate as well.  
The conditions that are conducive to Open-Source (as opposed to IP-based) 
technology systems (Lerner & Tirole 2002) may hold in both cases.  Access could be 
restricted to players who supply data to the system.  A function that would be much 
more difficult to provide collectively would be expert analysis and understanding of 
the data and concepts publicly offered.  So, there could be a publicly available system 
of data and concepts in place, with private expert consultants competing to use these 
for customer-specific applications.  One possible funding arrangement for such a 
structure could be a consortium of leading consultancy firms, who might perceive 
membership in such a consortium to yield a net benefit due to the likely positive 
impact on the quality of their services.  Note that the system would probably not 
negatively impact their distinctive expertise as their commercial raison d’être, 
because the open-source MEMOREL system would require specialist knowledge to 
be fruitfully accessed and applied. 
  An increased awareness of IPS and MEMOREL could have a significant 
economic impact, as players would be better able to (1) reduce inefficiencies due to 
incentive problems and (2) identify valuable novel combinations of partners and IP 
assets due to improved information and combinatorics. 
 
 
10. Relational Economics 
  
MEMOREL can be viewed as a subset of relational economics, which can be 
defined as a methodology that emphasises relationships between (1) decision-making 
units, (2) economic concepts, (3) fields of economics, (4) paradigms of economics, (5) 
economics and other disciplines, (6) the academic economic literature and its real-
world applications, and (7) different types of economic data.  We shall next consider 
each of these aspects of relational economics in turn.  While reading the following   20
overview, the reader should bear in mind the following key point: relational 
economics complements methodologies commonly used in economics by developing 
meta-structures.  An example of a meta-structure is a typology of economic 
relationships.  Another important example is bibliometric analysis of economic 
research. 
  (1) Decision-making units.  MEMOREL is the composition of larger 
structures, such as decision trees, that embed game models without actually 
integrating them into a single large model.  To analyse an irreducibly complex choice 
problem, such as the aforementioned need for a proprietary input, we may not always 
need to go as far as a complete MEMOREL analysis, which would be quite time-
consuming and has – to my knowledge – never been carried out yet.  Instead, a verbal 
analysis of the choice problem that is implicitly informed by game-theoretic 
knowledge and that organises large amounts of case-specific information into a 
complete set of relationship types will often prove a cost-effective method for 
generating insight.  Such an analysis may be dubbed Verbal Relational Analysis 
(VERELAN) and is attempted in Binenbaum & Pardey (2004), which is a policy 
piece on the IP strategy of International Agricultural Research Centres. 
  In analysing choice problems, MEMOREL occupies a middle ground between 
VERELAN and what may be termed Real Games.  A Real Game is a complete and 
integrated single game model applied to a real-world situation – which in some cases 
may be feasible and worthwhile.  As a step in constructing a Real Game, a 
MEMOREL structure could be consulted to make sure no relevant relationship types 
and subgames are overlooked.  Note that the applicable MEMOREL structure could 
pre-exist at the time that the Real Game is constructed, as MEMOREL structures 
could be developed to be applicable various sets of Real Games.  VERELAN, in turn, 
could be a step in the creation of a MEMOREL structure. 
  As explained above, relational economics can be used to analyse not only 
complex choices but also economic systems such as innovation systems (as well as 
intermediate-level phenomena between the extremes of single choice problems and 
systems).  Analysts of innovation systems may easily mistake a complete description 
of the nodes of a system for a complete description of the system.  When the nodes 
are decision-making units, we need to be careful not to overlook relevant types of 
connections (relationships) between them, as happened in the aforementioned OECD   21
study which mostly ignored the kinds of relationships that are studied in the 
conventional industrial organisation literature. 
  (2) Economic concepts.  There may be much scope for the creation of useful 
structures that link together economic concepts in order to make them more easily 
accessible and combinable.  While the economic literature develops many concepts, 
there appears to be little literature beyond textbooks that attempts to link them 
together in larger structures such as taxonomies.   MEMOREL would be but one of 
the ways to do this (as we do not need to use models as the objects to be organised). 
  (3) Fields of economics.  Fields, sub-fields, sub-sub-fields, et cetera, of 
mainstream economics, tend to evolve naturally around canonical choice problems.  
The resultant set of hyper-specialised literatures may contain many insights, but most 
of the papers that contain them are rarely cited and probably rarely applied.  The 
economic value of much of the economic literature is thus questionable.  This 
situation may be improved by structuring systems of insights in such a way that they 
are accessible for economists outside of the areas of specialisation, and through 
collaborative structures that allow for larger teams than are currently customary in the 
economics profession.  Thus, relational economics would not only provide structures 
of concepts, but also methods and (inter-)organisational structures that facilitate 
economies of scale and scope in economic research. 
(4) Paradigms of economics.  Economists are not only divided into a panoply 
of specialisms, but are also divided in different schools of thought whose insights may 
be competing or complementary.  Where these insights compete with each other, 
econometric testing is often not feasible, because, to do this, models common to 
alternative hypotheses must be specified.  However, the insights can be structured to 
clarify the origins of differences, to transcend these by relating them to sets of 
alternative assumptions and methods for selecting the appropriate assumptions.   
Where econometric testing of alternative hypotheses is feasible, it should be borne in 
mind that economic hypotheses are different from their counterparts in the hard 
sciences.  Since the assumptions underpinning the hypotheses may or may not hold, 
all that econometric testing does is to provide evidence on the relative prevalence of 
different patterns.  In contrast to natural laws, alternative economic hypotheses can 
coexist in the real world because different sets of assumptions will often be satisfied 
in different real-world data-generating processes.  So the role of economics and 
econometrics is to assist us in pattern recognition; they help us identify common   22
patterns rather than universal laws.  When we pragmatically recognise this, it becomes 
easier to integrate and synthesise insights from the different schools of thought. 
Complementarities and syntheses between insights emanating from different 
schools of thought are awaiting discovery.  There appears to be an under-supply of 
such meta-paradigmatic analyses, especially where applications to real-world 
problems are concerned. 
The field of bibliometrics is currently under-used in economic analysis.  On 
many theoretical and real-world issues, economists disagree.  For analytical purposes, 
it would often be highly useful to juxtapose, organise and integrate different expert 
opinions.  Bibliometric analysis with improved citations data, that differentiate 
between types of citations such as “invoking as an authority opinion”, “referring for 
proof”, “criticising”, etc., would be very useful in this context.  An example of the 
applicability of such work – namely, in antitrust court cases – is provided below. 
(5) Other disciplines.  All the fundamental assumptions of economics 
properly belong to the subject matter of other disciplines.  Some assumptions are 
technological, others are psychological or sociological in nature.  To bridge the large 
cultural and methodological gaps between economics and engineering and the social 
sciences, it would be useful to embed the sets of assumptions that economists can 
choose from for their models into larger structures that both economists and experts 
from other disciplines can relate to.  To be sure, multidisciplinary research teams may 
not always be the optimal solution to complex problems, as bridging the 
interdisciplinary cultural and other gaps may prove too costly.  As an alternative, 
multidisciplinary collaborations could focus on the assumptions themselves, yielding 
menus of assumptions (complete with their pros and cons from the perspective of 
their ‘mother disciplines’) that economists can then use to select modelling 
assumptions from depending on the nature of their specific research projects (which 
would in this scenario be carried out by the economists alone). 
(6) Real-world applications.  It is the role of consultants, advisors, expert 
witnesses in court cases, and other analysts to bridge the gap between the academic 
economic literature and its application to real-world problems.  As explained above, 
this role would be greatly facilitated by larger structures – such as MEMOREL 
structures – that embed insights from the economic literature, thus enhancing that 
literature’s economic value.   23
(7) Data.  A relational economics would involve an improved system of 
relational databases.  Once we have a complete set of relationship types, we are in a 
much better position to design data sets describing systems of economic players.  As 
discussed above, considering the current advanced state of information and 
communication technology, the potential economies of scale and scope of integrated 
data sets for economic systems have not yet been realised.  As a result, inefficiencies 
caused by missing and asymmetric information are likely to be unnecessarily large.  
As commercial data providers do not have the incentives to create the integrated and 
well-structured data sets that would be most cost-effective to players in the economy, 
collective action to (1) integrate data sets, (2) elicit additional data supplies, (3) make 
the integrated data sets conform with the structures of economic logic such as 
MEMOREL, and (4) make the integrated data sets quickly accessible and transparent, 
is called for.  An example of useful data would be on inter-organisational R&D 
partnerships.  For instance, small biotechnology firms that need partnerships with a 
multinational pharmaceutical firm for development and marketing purposes could 
benefit from a data set that conveys information on past performance and policies of 
multinationals in such partnerships.  Such data could be combined with data on 
competitive relationships, vertical relationships, ownership trees, complementary and 
competing IP assets, etc. etc.  As the players in innovation systems have headquarters 
in specific locations, local network economy mapping initiatives (NEMIs) could fill 
the void left by insufficient and fragmented data supplies by existing data providers, 
and could standardise their specifications and merge their data sets with a global 
consortium of NEMIs (CONEMI).  A structure of NEMIs and CONEMI, funded 
collectively in some way, would take a significant effort to properly design, and 
would require incentives for data sharing (for instance, anybody wanting to access a 
CONEMI data set would have to agree to supply data to it).  Once in place, however, 
such a structure could prove highly cost-effective and vastly superior to the currently 
existing data supplies.  Strategic decision-making might well be significantly 
enhanced and sped up by it. 
    Relational economics, consisting of these seven aspects, will be 
complementary to the current conventional methodology of parsimonious modelling 
and hypothesis-testing carried out by very small teams of specialised economists.  It 
will enhance this conventional methodology rather than compete against it. 
   24
11.  Industrial Organisation as a Future Centrepiece of Relational Economics? 
 
  How, realistically speaking, could a relational economics evolve out of 
economics as it is currently practiced?  It appears to be a long way removed from 
current economic methodology.  The answer may be found in the field of industrial 
organisation (IO). 
  The structure-conduct-performance paradigm of IO, developed in the late 
1930s and 1940s, gave way to an IO approach predominantly based on game theory in 
the latter decades of the 20
th century (Waldman & Jensen 2001: 5-7).  The game-
theoretic approach analysed a large number of permutations of vertical and horizontal 
market structures, based on underlying technologies.  These analyses were often 
linked to antitrust legal and policy cases.  While the number of permutations of 
market structure is large, it is not unmanageably large, and the mainstream theoretical 
IO literature seemed to have reached a certain degree of saturation by the 1990s.  
Thus, a reviewer of an edited volume on Applied Industrial Organization (Aiginger & 
Finsinger 1994) commented: “While the theoretical advances in Industrial 
Organization over the last couple of decades have been exciting and fruitful, the 
nature of much of the recent theoretical work has turned from major innovation to 
refinement. In contrast, there are still rich fields to be mined in empirical IO” (Suslow 
1997). 
  This perception no longer exists today.  A strand in the IO literature that seeks 
to endogenise technology – thus moving IO towards the economics-of-innovation 
literature – has always coexisted with the exogenous-technology IO research, but has 
recently become so important that theoretical IO is now being seen as an exciting field 
full of opportunities for innovative research.  Sutton (1998) may have been a decisive 
part of this development.  Nowadays, the two leading field journals (the International 
Journal of Industrial Organization and the Journal of Industrial Economics) are 
publishing so many articles that focus on innovation and technology dynamics that it 
has become hard to distinguish between the fields of IO and economics of innovation.  
This trend has perhaps been reinforced by an increased emphasis in the economics-of-
innovation literature on inter-organisational relationships. 
  The increased importance of innovation within the field of IO may enable it, in 
turn, to assume a central role in the discipline of economics and its methodology.  
Two aspects of IO that would be conducive to such a role were already in place prior   25
to this recent trend.  First, IO may always have been the field of economics par 
excellence that is concerned with inter-organisational relations.  Second, IO is the 
field of economics that by its nature comes closest to bridging the gap between 
strategic management and economics, which would, as argued above, benefit both.  
Reinforcing these two aspects, the more prominent role of innovation in IO may now 
be forcing the latter to give pride of place to the relationship types of collaboration, 
communication and perhaps even gift, in addition to the relationship types it has 
traditionally considered, namely competition, collusion and exchange.  This is 
obvious in the case of collaboration and communication: Collaborations are seen as 
critical to innovation, and these are difficult to select, design, and coordinate – hence 
the importance of asymmetric information and communication.  Additionally, trust 
and a mutual willingness to go beyond formal contractual obligations are seen to be 
important success factors in collaborative R&D (Nooteboom 1999, 2002).  Thus, 
there may be a significant gift element in collaborative R&D. 
  As consideration of innovation prompts consideration of additional relational 
types, IO may be well-positioned to assume a central role in moving economics 
towards the relational-economics methodology.  IO itself might greatly benefit from 
embracing the seven aspects of relational economics.  For example, funding for IO 
research might improve as a function of its being rendered more applicable to antitrust 
court cases.  Economic experts wishing to cost-effectively develop systemic analysis 
of the players relevant to the lawsuit under consideration could employ existing 
VERELAN or MEMOREL templates to make sure not to overlook key interactions 
between those players.  In arguing their cases, the opposing sides might benefit from 
existing user-friendly databases of academic contributions developed with the aid of 
advanced bibliometric techniques that distinguish between different types of citations 
(as discussed above).  As a result, the quality of legal antitrust decision-making could 
be increased, while simultaneously transaction costs could be educed.  Of course, this 
requires that the VERELAN/MEMOREL templates or the high-quality databases of 
academic papers first be developed, so that all expert witnesses in antitrust cases have 
access to them.  It is understandable that the field of IO and economics generally have 
not yet caught up with the recent spectacular advances in information and 
communication technology, but they would need to apply the principles of relational 
economics in order to most fruitfully do so. 
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12. Synopsis: The paper’s arguments in a nutshell 
 
  There is a methodological gulf between economics and strategic management, 
including intellectual property strategy (IPS).  As a result, both academic 
communities suffer, because they are not fully benefiting from complementarities 
between their insights. This paper suggests that there is potential for improving IPS; 
that doing so may well have a substantial economic impact; and that economics can 
play a key role in this endeavour. The argument can be summarised as follows: 
1. The fundamental problem of the economics of IPS is its irreducible complexity. 
2. Economics can deal with this problem through meta-modelling of relations. 
3. This requires certain theoretical and applied methodologies – and as these, by and 
large, have not been implemented so far, there is scope for improvement. 
4. The gap between actual and potential quality of IPS is exacerbated by cognitive 
obstacles, which can be overcome – hence, again, there is scope for improvement. 
5. The characteristics of the technology for producing IPS inputs and improving IPS, 
coupled with incentive problems and the potential for institutional innovation to solve 
these problems, jointly imply another source of potential improvement of IPS. 
6. Incentive problems are pervasive in innovation systems; their mitigation could 
yield significant economic benefits; and improved IPS interaction would contribute to 
such mitigation – thus improved IPS may yield substantial benefits. 
  This paper puts this argument in a larger methodological context.  It argues 
that economics needs to supplement its focus on parsimonious modelling and 
hypothesis testing with an increased attention for relationships between (1) decision-
making units, (2) economic concepts, (3) fields of economics, (4) paradigms of 
economics, (5) economics and other disciplines, (6) the academic economic literature 
and its real-world applications, and (7) different types of economic data.  An 
economics that sufficiently takes into account these interrelationships may be called 
relational economics.  It should be noted that relational economics would be more 
‘rigorous’ than current economic methodology, as true ‘rigour’ is philosophical in 
nature rather than narrowly mathematical.  For instance, it may not be good enough 
just to use a precise mathematical model and then test the resulting hypotheses, 
because we might need to be very careful about the assumptions on which the model 
is based.  To be more careful about the assumptions, we need to understand the real-
world system that we are seeking to model.  And to understand the real-world system,   27
it would be very useful to understand what might constitute a complete description of 
the system.  To understand what would constitute a complete (or feasibly close to 
ideal of completeness) systemic description, we need to have an idea of what the 
relevant relation types are, so as not to overlook relevant interactions between the 
players that are the nodes of the system. 
  Relational economics does not seek to supplant, but rather to integrate and 
supplement the conventional mathematical-theoretical and econometric-empirical 
methods of economic research, thus improving the quality of these methods and 
enhancing the applicability and value of this research. 
  Of the seven aspects of relational economics – i.e., seven levels of 
interrelationships – this paper pays particular attention to aspect (1), inter-
organisational relationships.  Two important IPS choice problems, namely the need 
for a proprietary research input and the choice whether or not to seek IP protection, 
may both be irreducibly complex, i.e., not amenable to analysis using the standard 
methodology of parsimonious modelling and hypothesis-testing.  They may, however, 
be analysed using relational economics, especially its component MEMOREL (meta-
modelling of relationships).  Using MEMOREL, such choice problems can be seen to 
be composed of sub-problems that are amenable to parsimonious modelling and 
hypothesis-testing.  The insights from these sub-problems then still need to be 
combined by the analyst through other methods, including Gestalt intuition. 
Relational economics may thus render conventional economics more insightful, more 
valuable, and more applicable to real-world problems. 
  This paper then argues that industrial organisation (IO) may be the field of 
economics best placed to make economics more relational.  IO is naturally close to 
strategic management, and may thus serve as a bridge between management studies 
and economics.  It is also naturally preoccupied with inter-organisational 
relationships.  And due to the increased prominence in the IO literature of innovation, 
IO is poised to incorporate into its analyses the relationship types of collaboration, 
communication and gift, thus supplementing its traditional focus on competition, 
collusion, and exchange.  This consideration of a broader range of relationship types 
may enable IO to embrace relational economics and help move economics in the same 
direction.  It may also enhance the value of academic IO research in real-world 
applications such as expert testimony in antitrust lawsuits.   28
It is understandable that the field of IO and economics generally have not yet 
caught up with the recent spectacular advances in information and communication 
technology, but they would need to apply the principles of relational economics in 
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